Nakasone Yasuhiro
中曽根康弘
Yasuhiro Nakasone
(1918- )
Yasuhiro Nakasone
became Japan’s first English-speaking prime minister in 1982. He is
remembered by Americans and Japanese alike for his contrarian notions—and
occasional gaffes.
An Advocate of a Stronger Japanese
Military
During the 1970s
Nakasone was the Director-General of Japan’s Defense agency. Nakasone had
been a junior officer in the Japanese wartime navy, and he was alarmed at
the “power vacuum” created by Japan’s postwar disarmament. The
increasingly aggressive stance of the Soviet Union in the postwar years
prompted Nakasone to call for a reassessment of
Japan’s constitutional pacifism. By the early 1970s, the
Soviet Union was making alarming
expansions of its military presence at Vladivostok, just north of the
Japanese islands.
In 1976 a Soviet
MiG-25 pilot successfully evaded Japanese radar, and landed in Hokkaido.
The Russian pilot’s objective was a plea for asylum—not an attack on
Japan—but the incident served to highlight the country’s lack of military
defenses. Nonetheless, the doves generally prevailed over the hawks in the
Japanese Diet, and few of Director-General Nakasone’s more radical ideas
were implemented.
Prime Minister Nakasone
When he was elected
to the position of prime minister in 1982, Ronald Reagan occupied the U.S.
White House. Pundits in the press and academia expressed hope that
Nakasone’s English skills would enable him to have a close working
relationship with Reagan. However, economic tensions between Japan and
America intervened. In the early 1980s, the U.S. economy was mired in
recession, and the American automotive industry was losing market share to
Japanese imports. Labor leaders and politicians were calling for
protective tariffs and quotas on Japanese cars. American critics of Japan
charged that the Japanese market was closed to outsiders by a series of
structural barriers.
Nakasone responded to
the crisis by making a personal appeal to his constituency. In 1985 he
appeared on Japanese television, and encouraged every Japanese citizen to
purchase at least $100 worth of foreign goods. But the example products he
suggested were mostly low-tech items like textiles and cookware. It was as
if the prime minister could not seriously ask Japanese consumers to buy
American automobiles—the product most symbolic of the U.S.-Japan trade
friction.
In 1986, a Japanese
government initiative called the Maekawa Report proposed a series of steps
for making the domestic market more open to foreign competition. Many of
the steps detailed in the report were implemented—but the main
beneficiaries were companies in
Taiwan and South Korea—not American
manufacturers. Nakasone seemed unable to defuse the growing trade
tension.
Then he made his most
memorable faux pas. In an apparent attempt to explain away America’s
economic problems, Nakasone noted that Americans could not really be
expected to compete effectively with Japanese. Japanese, after all, were
more intelligent and far better educated.
When this bombshell
hit the press, the prime minister felt compelled to explain: Americans
were not necessarily less intelligent, but the country was hampered by its
ethnic and racial diversity. How could America compete with so many
blacks and Hispanics, the prime minister wondered aloud to the
international press.
Nakasone has secured
his place as one of Japan’s most memorable and opinionated prime
ministers. Unfortunately, though, his administration was not as beneficial
for U.S.-Japan relations as his supporters had hoped; and his racist
remarks tainted his efforts to promote Japan abroad.